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Abstract 
Representation is often raised as a legitimacy problem for NGOs based on 
questions about who is intended to express consent, in what capacity, and for 
what purpose. This paper provides a framework to explore the transversal nature 
of NGOs’ socio-political community by looking at which audiences confer 
legitimacy onto NGOs and which actions these audiences undertake can 
constitute a public affirmation of expressed consent. The paper operationalises 
Beetham’s theory of legitimation to explore what actions might count as 
expressed consent and thus be analysed as actions that confer legitimacy or 
delegitimize NGOs. The framework looks at eight groups of audiences that 
engage with NGOs in terms of power. The conclusion stresses that the power 
dynamics between an NGO and its audiences are highly fragmented and need 
more analytic attention if we are to better understand how issues of 
representation underpin and/or problematize NGOs’ legitimate role in 
international politics.  
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An important criticism often levelled at NGOs in international politics is that they 
have no identifiable constituency ‘with whom to engage in dialogue’ 
(Yanacopulos, 2016: 50). This is because as large complex organisations they 
are ‘highly removed from any basic social or political community’ (Lupel, 2005: 
130). At the heart of these criticisms is a claim that NGOs lack an audience that 
can function as a demos for their legitimacy claims (Lehr-Lehnardt, 2005: 14; 
Mercer, 2002: 13), which leaves their constituency ‘confined to educated staff 
members’ (Banks et al., 2015: 709). Yet, despite the identified democratic 
shortcomings of NGOs, there are at the same time plenty of examples in the 
literature where this non-existing demos is referred to as ‘multiple audiences’, 
‘target audiences’ or ‘key audiences’, and in some rare cases scholars probe 
directly whether NGOs can represent ‘a certain constituency’ (Dodworth, 2014: 
29; Gourevitch and Lake, 2012: 193; Gutterman, 2014: 398; Haufler, 2010: 112; 
Horton and Roche, 2010: 6). The problem with such references is that they imply, 
directly or indirectly, that there is such a thing as an NGO socio-political 
community but do so without identifying its characteristics. The purpose of this 
paper is to bridge this gap and pin down with more accuracy not only who is 
involved in conferring legitimacy onto NGOs but also in what capacity they do so. 
Audiences are often mentioned or alluded to in the context of legitimacy and 
accountability, especially in debates about the role NGOs have come to play in 
both international and domestic politics. According to Shivji (2007: 43-44), NGOs 
operating in Africa have in many cases been subsumed into formal policy 
processes where they have taken on semi-sovereign roles without any apparent 
forms of accountability. This, he argues, is problematic because it is not clear 
‘which interest is being served by a particular policy. A question about which there 
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can be neither neutrality nor non-partisanship’ (Shivji, 2007: 43). One of the 
critical lessons from Shivji’s book that is relevant for this article is that NGOs, as 
international actors subject to the drivers of globalisation and global agendas, 
lack a clear local (or for that matter global) constituency that can legitimise the 
representative role they play as international actors in domestic politics.  
While scholars generally agree that NGOs have some form of power, there is 
disagreement about how that power should be accounted for. Most scholars 
would agree that NGOs have no coercive powers in international politics. At the 
same time analysts also recognise that ‘there is very little “smart power,” or “soft 
power,” without them’ (Wittes, 2013: 2). It is important to stress the centrality of 
power in the analysis of legitimacy, because without it legitimacy becomes 
diluted, and possibly meaningless, as a political concept. Power, according to 
Beetham, is an essential ingredient of legitimacy: ’All societies find it necessary 
to regulate the access to and exercise of power; and wherever power is organised 
and distributed in accordance with social rules ... these rules stand in need of 
legitimation’ (Beetham, 2013: 39). Thus, he argues, we cannot separate power 
from legitimacy without legitimacy falling short as a political concept.  
This understanding of power presumes that legitimacy is a relational concept. 
The audiences framework introduced here is based on the idea that legitimacy, 
as a relational concept, can be used to analyse the power dynamics in the 
relationships between an NGO and its audiences. That is, a power relationship 
between two entities where one is aiming to ‘achieve their purposes through 
others’ and where legitimacy is used to analyse how these entities engage and 
how their normative status is derived from the ‘character of a legitimate power 
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relationship as legally valid, justifiable according to shared norms and beliefs, and 
confirmed through actions expressing consent’ (Beetham, 2013: 38). As Beetham 
states: 
“If power is one person’s ability to achieve their purposes through others, then 
it cannot be a matter of capacities and resources alone, but also depends on 
the degree of the others’ willingness to cooperate. And that willingness cannot 
be sufficiently created by incentives and sanctions on their own; it depends 
on the normative status of the power holder, and on normative considerations 
that engage us as moral agents. This normative status derives from the 
character of a legitimate power relationship as legally valid, justifiable 
according to shared norms and beliefs, and confirmed through actions 
expressing consent (Beetham, 2013: 38 [emphasis added]).” 
It is what these ‘actions expressing consent’ might entail for NGOs’ legitimation 
of power that this paper is concerned with, explored through the questions of who 
is expected to confer legitimacy onto NGOs, what might constitute such an act, 
in what capacity they confer legitimacy, and what limitations these acts impose 
on NGOs’ power. The paper looks at the power dynamics of the relationships 
between an NGO and eight groups of audiences that NGOs meaningfully engage 
with, and which can be viewed as a potential socio-political community. In so 
doing, the paper aims to fulfil two tasks, a conceptual task in advancing theories 
on NGO political legitimacy, and a heuristic task that outlines a typology of NGO 
audiences that can legitimate the power of NGOs.  
Conferring legitimacy onto NGOs: the problem with power  
and representation 
Before focusing on what actions might constitute expressed consent it is 
important to understand the representative dilemma, and criticism thereof, that 
NGOs have become saddled with. The wider literature on representation and 
legitimacy emphasises both how our understanding of representation is 
embedded in democratic political systems as an all-inclusive concept 
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(Mansbridge, 2011), and how there is a need to expand the concept to explore it 
in wider political settings including what constitutes the ‘activity of representing’ 
(Rehfeld, 2011: 636). According to Rehfeld (2011: 640) ‘representation should be 
conceived in audience-centred ways entirely independent of democratic 
concerns’. This conceptualisation opens the door for exploring how 
representation applies to NGOs as entities outside the traditional boundaries of 
representative democracy but tiptoeing on the sidelines peering in.   
In the more NGO specific literature this discussion takes shape along the same 
lines where representation is identified as a problem or issue for NGO legitimacy. 
According to Montanaro (2012: 1106) since ‘nonelected actors increasingly offer 
claims of representation’ there is a corresponding need for ‘a theory of democratic 
representation that will provide the conceptual tools to assess if, and when, 
nonelectoral forms of representation can be democratically legitimate’. The 
argument Montanaro (2012: 1095) makes is that legitimacy as an act of claim 
making can accommodate self-appointed representation as democratic, but only 
‘if the affected constituency is empowered to authorize and demand 
accountability of the self-appointed representative’. This, she argues, can be 
achieved through a norm that can ‘give political presence to those whose 
interests are affected’ thus making them ‘visible and audible as affected’ with 
‘powers of authorization and accountability’ vis-a-vis the NGO (Montanaro, 2012: 
1098).  
A possible problem with Montanaro’s argument is that it is limited to an 
understanding of legitimacy as claiming self-legitimation and thus focuses on how 
NGOs perceive and justify their power and is less concerned with how such 
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‘legitimations are acknowledged or accepted by those subject to it’ which, 
according to Beetham, is a crucial part of understanding not only the 
effectiveness of their authority but also the quality of their legitimations vis-a-vis 
‘the wider society’ (Beetham, 2013: 255-6). Montanaro’s argument thus focuses 
on credibility of NGOs’ legitimacy claims where the solution is about recognising 
how their supposedly represented audience is made visible and as such 
empowered as an affected group. Brown (2008) has furthermore argued that 
NGO legitimacy is primarily about ‘creating credibility’ that can be validated on a 
peer-to-peer basis between NGOs through a system of self-regulation. An 
argument that has been echoed by other scholars claiming that ‘NGOs that lack 
credibility with key audiences ... are almost certain to fail in their quest to bring 
about social change’ (Gourevitch and Lake, 2012: 193). 
The upkeep of credibility for self-legitimating purposes is however, as many 
scholars have shown, not a sufficient explanation of NGOs’ legitimacy. Gutterman 
(2014: 398) for example states that ‘a TNGO’s target audience (rather than the 
TNGO itself or the issue it addresses) determines which types of legitimacy are 
required, and which characteristics secure such legitimacy’. The shortcoming of 
arguments that focus on credibility and self-legitimation is that they do not specify 
how ‘key audiences’ can instigate a process that would lead to such an outcome 
(which brings us back into conflict with representation as a concept). But analysis 
of legitimacy as a relational concept requires that theories also explain whether 
and how the affected constituency can have access to decision-making 
processes, not only for the purpose of honouring the terms of their contract with 
NGOs, but more importantly how they can terminate it. This is the main hurdle to 
overcome in examining representation as a legitimacy construct, that is, the 
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question of ‘how can we get rid of you’ (Benn, 1991). This includes the procedural 
aspect of power, that is, what processes or rules can be implemented to help the 
key audiences to terminate the relationship that so directly affects them. Despite 
the significance of credibility in constructing legitimacy, theories limited to such a 
view do not adequately answer the issue of representation because they 
circumvent the normative structure of power.  
One attempt to do this has been made by Jennifer Rubenstein in her book on 
political ethics for humanitarian NGOs, Between Samaritans and States, where 
she makes a case for a justice-based analysis of NGOs’ power to overcome this 
dilemma. She develops a theory that explains how humanitarian NGOs are 
frequently faced with moral challenges and difficult choices as actors caught 
between the public and the private sector. By characterising NGOs as moral 
agents involved in ‘conventional governance to some degree’ she makes the 
case for situating NGOs as ‘in-between’ actors. That is, as actors that ‘exercise 
tremendous power’, for example over aid recipients, and who have others, for 
example donors, ‘exercise tremendous power over them’ (Rubenstein, 2015: 
209-210). The thrust of her argument is that NGOs’ power should not be in terms 
of how bad their representation is but about normative assessments such as 
whether NGOs ‘undermine the interests of poor and marginalized peoples’ 
(Rubenstein, 2015: 131). Her thesis thus shifts the focus from representative 
based arguments to a justice-based argument proposing that we focus on ‘how 
well they avoid misusing their power’ (Rubenstein, 2015: 121). 
Despite the pushback Rubenstein’s theory provides against the limits of credibility 
and representative arguments some scholars have major reserves about building 
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NGO legitimacy around justice-based theories. According to Erman (2106) such 
an approach overlooks the importance of process for legitimating political power. 
Erman argues that: ‘A major limitation of the “justice path” is that it tends to 
neglect the procedural aspects of legitimacy, which cannot be fully responded to 
via substantive demands such as through the redistribution of basic human rights’ 
(Erman, 2016: 30). The concern is that such an analysis disconnects legitimacy 
and politics in a way that de-politicises NGOs. It follows that if we are to accept 
that it is beside the point ‘who elected Oxfam’ we choose to ignore the political 
context of NGOs’ power. Ellis (2010: 81) raises this point when he questions the 
real life implications of such an analysis: ‘When leaders of NGOs with tens or 
hundreds of thousands of largely passive donors ... meet with a Minister to talk 
about aid and foreign policy, are those individuals really only providing 
information and expertise and standing up for core values? Or are they seen as 
representatives of an important political constituency?’ This is indeed the case, 
nonelective representation happens in real life as both Rehfeld and Montanaro 
point out, and as is evident throughout both the academic and the growing grey 
literatures where NGOs are cast, perhaps unwittingly, as representatives of 
marginalised or excluded peoples (United Nations, 2004; Bebbington, 2005; 
Lang, 2012; Greenpeace India, 2015).  
As these theories highlight the different approaches to how we can analyse the 
representativeness of NGOs they are limited in the sense that they are either too 
close to our understanding of democratic representation as legitimated by 
elections, thus clouding our judgement, or too far from how we practice 
democracy in reality and thus theoretically unhelpful. What this highlights is a 
fragmented understanding of NGO legitimacy and representation. Addressing 
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this disparity matters because NGOs have become increasingly significant actors 
in international politics capable of influencing political debates and are largely 
perceived by other actors as representing global publics (Halpin, 2010: 12). Some 
argue that the role NGOs play in international organisations is political because 
they behave as political opposition exercising ‘authority in the international realm 
in a way that goes beyond commands’, which in turn has contributed to the 
politicisation of these institutions (Zürn et al., 2012: 71, 86). This is sometimes 
theorised as NGOs’ ability to induce normative change in international politics, 
ranging from their formal participation in governmental institutions to informal 
lobbying at invitation only meetings on global issues (Clark, 2001; Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Avant et al., 2010).  
However, it is also becoming clear that NGOs’ power and influence is under 
increasing pressure with the pushback against them in the emerging powers 
(Sidel, 2016; Walton et al., 2016). The pressure is mainly on the principle of 
associational freedom, one that NGOs rely on as the ultimate guarantee for their 
right to exist. This involves querying whether current regulation, mostly in the form 
of financial accountability, provides satisfying ‘checks and balances’ when it 
comes to scrutinising the power of non-state actors and the influence they wield 
on policy-making (Lipton and Williams, 2016).  
In sum, what the existing literature highlights is that there is a common notion in 
the literature about NGOs having or needing constituencies and that these 
comprise audiences that need to be integrated into theories about NGO 
legitimacy. Because in the end if we are to overcome the mismatch of power and 
the representative gap in global governance, as cosmopolitan scholars put it, 
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‘IGOs and INGOs, like states, need to be bound by a rule-based order’ (Held, 
2009: 544-546). The paper contributes to this debate by offering a framework of 
possible audiences that can be seen to be in a position to legitimate an NGO’s 
power. 
Audiences for NGOs’ legitimacy claims: a typology of power  
relationships 
According to Beetham (2013: 39, 20) legitimacy is not a sum of legitimations that 
are to be accepted, but an intrinsic part of power itself. As such it requires three 
things: legal validity, justification of shared beliefs, and expressed consent. As 
outlined above the least theorised of these for NGO legitimacy is expressed 
consent. The framework is thus a way to operationalise Beetham’s third criterion. 
I put forward the following questions as a premise for the framework:   
 What is the action of expressed consent? This question allows us to reflect 
on what type of power relationship it is.   What hidden assumptions do different audiences have about NGO 
legitimacy? This question allows us to reflect on what expectations an 
audience may have about the purpose and abilities of NGOs.   In what capacity are NGOs’ legitimacy claims considered? This question 
allows us to reflect what the justification or purpose is for conferring 
legitimacy onto NGOs.  What problems are related to the affirmation? This question allows us to 
reflect on the quality (or limits) of the action constituting expressed 
consent.  What is the possible outcome of lack of consent, no consent, or withdrawal 
of consent? This question allows us to reflect on the triggers of 
delegitimation. 
These questions address not only who is giving consent, but also in what form, 
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for what purpose, and whether these audiences can place effective restraints on 
NGOs’ power. Thus the framework tries to analyse what ‘expressed consent’ 
means for NGOs’ legitimacy. It starts with the assumption that by giving 
‘expressed consent’ a particular audience confers legitimacy onto an NGO, and 
then queries what constitutes such an action, if there are antecedents to that 
action (hidden assumptions), in what capacity the legitimacy claims might be 
considered (what is the purpose of the claim), possible problems (reflecting the 
quality of the action), and what constitutes withdrawal or refusal of expressed 
consent.   
The eight different groups of audiences include legislators and judiciary, donors, 
supporters, members, beneficiaries, international institutions, NGO peers, and 
the general public. These are groups that NGOs frequently interact with, they can 
be the target for their policy campaigns, or for fundraising, or when NGOs are 
claiming rights and/or representation for themselves and others. The framework 
highlights that the audiences are not uniform in their relationship with NGOs, 
some are in a legal position, some are in a peer position, whilst others may be 
financially or politically dependent on NGOs. The outcome of this categorization 
is hopefully a first step in a meaningful heuristic conception of a potential socio-
political community that can be analysed based on their actions expressing 
consent, and the analyses of how NGOs’ power is legitimated. The following 
section outlines the characteristics of each audiences group belonging to this 
socio-political community and the power dynamic in their relationship with NGOs. 
This includes, as per above, what actions constitute their expressed consent, in 
what capacity their claims are considered, what problems are related to their 
actions of expressed consent, and what are the possible triggers for processes 
  
 
13 
 
of delegitimation. 
NGOs vis-a-vis legislators and judiciary. This audience is possibly the least 
explored in terms of NGO legitimacy. This power relationship places NGOs in a 
legally subordinate position where NGOs are seeking legal rights from 
institutions/entities that can grant them such rights. This makes NGOs dependent 
on certain affirmative procedures from this audience (legislators and/or the 
judiciary). The relationship between NGOs and the legislators and judiciary is 
often subject to a specific law (e.g. the Charity Act), and regulated by a 
governmental body (e.g. the Charity Commission). Thus the action constituting 
expressed consent consists of issuing legal rights to NGOs within a particular 
jurisdiction. Consent is expressed in the form of legal rights and regulation, such 
as the Charity Act and the Charity Commission in Britain. As such this power 
relationship generates legal validity for NGOs that underpins, in most western 
liberal democracies and commonwealth legal traditions, their associational 
freedom.  
The problems associated with this type of expressed consent (and this type of 
power relationship) reflect jurisdictional limitations. It follows that there is often 
palpable tension between domestic law and the universal aspirations of many 
NGOs, which goes to show how NGOs are dependent on governments and 
domestic legal frameworks for this type of consent. It also highlights that there is 
a legitimacy gap between NGOs’ legal domestic base and their own internal 
organisation of power that is often global (Thrandardottir and Keating, 
forthcoming). Another problem here is the gap between the associational rights 
NGOs are provided with in domestic legal forums and their political advocacy as 
  
 
14 
 
a function of this freedom. This raises difficult questions, such as to what degree 
can NGOs be political without compromising their legal privileges? And to what 
degree does the jurisdictional limitation function as an escape clause for NGOs 
and to what degree is it a handicap in terms of lack of institutional support 
protecting their freedom. One notable example here is Amnesty International’s 
denial of charitable status in English law, a case that drew a line between 
charitable and political objectives of NGOs that came to underpin their 
subsequent registration and regulation (Chesterman, 1999; McGovern v A-G 
[1982]; Thrandardottir, 2012: 93-96). 
This audience can therefore be highly restrictive and problematic for NGOs, 
especially in countries where there is limited or no legal framework pertaining to 
NGOs, or in cases where the government raises legal or regulatory barriers to 
fundraising or registration that impacts on the operational capacity of NGOs 
(Rutzen, 2015). Withdrawal of consent, or severely restricted/limited consent, can 
thus trigger a process of delegitimation that undermines the association freedom 
of NGOs and deprives them of an environment (and thus ability) to function 
properly. Withdrawal of consent from this audience can therefore cause structural 
delegitimation to NGOs as recent studies indeed indicate (Christensen and 
Weinstein, 2013).   
NGOs vis-a-vis donors. Donors are perhaps the best represented group of the 
audiences within the literature. NGOs need them but at the same time are in 
many ways frustrated by the accountability frameworks imposed on them that are 
often directed to safeguard the financial interests of donors (Bond, 2015; 
Bebbington, 2005). This places NGOs in a financially, and possibly contractually, 
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subordinate position where consent is expressed via contractual obligations with 
financial transactions as a reward for meeting contractual criteria, and funds are 
withheld as punishment for failing to do so. Thus this power relationship is defined 
in monetary terms and has a tendency to reflect NGOs’ accountability according 
to donors’ needs and demands.1 
The power relationship between donors and NGOs is often regulated by 
contractual agreements and financial accountability audits. The most common 
format is that NGOs produce annual reports that demonstrate how donors’ 
monies are spent, and related reports showing how they have achieved 
predefined contractual objectives. This arrangement has been criticised in 
studies on NGO monitoring and evaluation undertakings that show that problems 
might be kept under the surface in order to not jeopardize future funding or the 
reputation of donors (Crack, 2016; LeBaron and Lister, 2015).  
NGOs’ legitimacy problems here are reflected in issues about how the normative 
purpose of NGOs is distorted by financial drivers and subsequently how the 
needs of NGOs’ intended beneficiaries are de-prioritised often coming second to 
NGOs’ accountability to donors. The main dynamic of this power relationship is 
therefore bound up with processes of delegitimation, the triggers being 
withdrawal of funds, no renewal of contracts, and un-subscriptions, all of which 
translate into smaller budgets and are likely to have a negative impact on an 
NGO’s operations capacity. 
NGOs vis-a-vis supporters. According to Halpin and McLaverty there is a 
                                            
1
 Emerging research is also challenging this paradigm; see for example Deloffre (2016). 
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significant distinction to be made between members and supporters of NGOs. 
One comprises NGOs based on membership, which we can have legitimate 
expectations to analyse as representative, the other NGOs that can only be 
analysed in terms of how solidarity to their cause is demonstrated (Halpin and 
McLaverty, 2010: 69). Starting with supporters and the power relationship NGOs 
have with this group it is clear that the action constituting consent for supporters, 
in stark contrast to members, is primarily a rhetorical act. This can be a vocal 
support for an NGO’s values as outlined in their mission statement (that often 
includes a vocabulary signalling that the NGO is doing the right thing, helping and 
caring, or changing wrong to right). The action constituting expressed consent 
from supporters can however also include physical demonstrations, such as 
volunteering, signing up to petitions or marching on campaigns. All indicate public 
endorsement. Supporters are frequently quoted in NGOs’ annual reports to justify 
their work, more so than reference to members because they are larger in 
number.   
The legitimacy problems here are possible political agendas and the globalisation 
of these agendas, where supporters become represented twice on certain issues, 
for example on environmental policy, once through their MP and again through 
their NGO (Anderson, 2010; Jones, 2004; Peruzzotti, 2006). Although the triggers 
for delegitimation are perhaps less clear, the absence of supporters at 
demonstrations and fewer supporters volunteering and donating can be seen as 
indicators of withdrawal of consent. More direct withdrawal would include 
mobilisation against the NGO to demonstrate discontent or to publicly state 
disapproval and withdrawal of moral support.  
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NGOs vis-a-vis members. Members are, according to democratic criteria, strong 
representation claimants as one of NGOs’ core constituency groups. Members, 
unlike supporters, can have (voting) rights within the organisation which gives 
them a significant influence over decision-making and the agenda of an NGO. 
This makes their action of expressed consent the most explicit of all the 
audiences and most in line with democratic expectations. An NGO with an 
internal democratic setup can thus make authoritative claims to represent the 
concerns of their members – and, as some scholars argue, in the wider political 
context this arrangement ‘can help to improve decision making at the global level’ 
(Halpin and McLaverty, 2010:69). Yet, members, despite their sway, are subject 
to the ultimate powers of the executive committee that controls who is and isn’t 
allowed to join as a member as well as often having decision-making powers that 
can bypass members. That is, although members can have voting rights within 
an NGO they are ultimately dependent on the board for approval of their 
membership which can be revoked (Thrandardottir, 2012).  
The legitimacy problems here often reflect issues surrounding personal agendas, 
nepotism and financial embezzlement, or possible procedural failures or mission 
drift where the executive, deliberately or unwittingly, bypasses the members. An 
example of this is a severance pay to an ex-Secretary General of Amnesty 
International that was decided by its executive committee without consulting the 
members. When the amount of the payout became public many Amnesty 
members vented their anger about not having been consulted on this issue and 
expressed anger about the amount they considered inappropriate and more in 
tune with the practices and mores of a for-profit organisation. This triggered a 
process of delegitimation where many high-profile Amnesty International 
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members resigned in a public fashion (Ainsworth, 2011). Another, more 
straightforward, problem that can trigger delegitimation in a membership run NGO 
is lack of members. This is increasingly the case for many large NGOs in the UK 
who have started to diversify their fundraising strategies to bridge the income gap 
due to lack of membership fees.  
NGOs vis-a-vis beneficiaries. This audience ought to be, and is often expressed 
to be, central to NGOs’ legitimacy. In reality, however, beneficiaries often get 
overshadowed by other audiences, in particular donors, when it comes to 
representation and legitimacy. The power relationship between NGOs and their 
beneficiaries places NGOs in a dominant position where NGOs have authority 
(delegated or not) over decisions that have a direct impact on this audience 
(Shivji, 2007). A possible action constituting expressed consent is the acceptance 
of aid (contractual or not) whether in the form of direct grants, advice in form of 
expertise, or surrogate representation at policy meetings or in bi- or multilateral 
negotiations (an example here is with IGOs, such as in WTO trade talks, where 
this audience is not represented or under-represented by their governments 
despite having direct interest in the outcome from such meetings).  
The quality of the action constituting expressed consent is problematic here 
because this audience is more often than not excluded from decision-making 
processes, not only in NGOs but also in their local community and the wider 
political processes. Some NGOs, such as Oxfam, have tried to institute formal 
mechanisms for beneficiaries to engage this audience more and make them 
integral to their internal legitimation processes through schemes such as 
complaint redress (Oxfam GB, 2014: 58). However, so far, it is not clear whether 
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this is achieving its purpose (Yanacopulos, 2016).  
There are serious questions to be asked of NGOs as the dominant party here in 
terms of how they legitimate their power, both from an ethical point of view as 
well as about processes because NGOs frequently make strong representation 
claims about this group, often blurring the line between NGOs and the 
government (Dodworth, 2014: 29). There are plenty of examples in the grey 
literature that reflect NGOs’ sense of moral duty to this audience, often phrased 
in democratic terms (Greenpeace India, 2015). However, when NGOs make 
claims such as ‘We work for the people, and by the people’ (Verma, 2015) they 
obfuscate the issue of representation. Framing legitimacy claims in terms of 
democracy and representation is not enough, especially since these claims are 
often poorly reflected in NGOs’ internal processes and organisation of power 
(Roose, 2012).  
Therefore legitimacy problems here include questions about what choices 
beneficiaries have to access decision-making processes to influence or challenge 
the values or priorities of the NGO that may affect them. In terms of triggering 
delegitimation a rejection of aid or other form of assistance offered by the NGO 
and/or rejection of their values or priorities would undermine or erode their 
legitimacy.  This is particularly problematic because the underlying (or explicit) 
expectations are very often about political and economic empowerment of 
beneficiaries — failing to internalise this in their power relationship with this 
audience poses a serious challenge to their legitimacy and ability to claim to 
represent them. The legitimacy challenges Greenpeace is facing in India is a 
recent example (Thrandardottir and Mitra, 2016).  
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NGOs vis-a-vis IGOs/IOs. This power relationship is characterized by signed 
contracts and registries that outline NGOs’ participation or observation in 
intergovernmental/international organisations (IGOs/IOs) (Lindblom, 2005; 
Willetts, 2011).2 This places NGOs in a subordinate position in a contractual 
relationship with an intergovernmental institution. These contracts enable NGOs 
to obtain a status where they are viewed to be catalysts or representatives of their 
members and supporters. In its famous Cardoso report, the United Nations panel 
on civil society relations declared that ‘Global civil society now wields real power 
in the name of citizens’ (United Nations, 2004: 26). Since then international 
institutions sometimes refer to NGOs as the voice of the global public that 
represents disempowered, under-represented people, or universal norms or 
ideas. As such they are seen to be channelling interests that get sidelined in 
domestic governmental processes and by default as a formative part of the 
solution to correct the democratic or legitimacy deficit in IGOs, albeit to a differing 
degree (Grant and Keohane, 2005; Archibugi and Held, 2011; Steffek, 2013). 
There are two major problems associated with this power relationship. First, is 
the quality of such representation, can NGOs contribute rightfully to legitimacy 
deficits in IGOs as proxies of the general public? Leading to the second concern 
about whether their lack of legal de jure status in international law undermines 
their representative abilities as it raises concerns about their status being entirely 
dependent on the arrangements it has with the institution at hand. These 
                                            
2
 Although I focus on IGOs here, such as the UN and EU, this category also includes IOs, such 
as religious institutions. For example, the Catholic Church’s main administrative body, the Roman 
Curia of the Holy See, is a significant IO correspondent for Cafod as an agency of the Bishops 
Conference of England and Wales.  
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problems are well documented in the literature’s discussions on the relationship 
between NGOs and IGOs (Steffek, 2013; Martens, 2005). Many have pointed out 
that NGOs have become integral to maintaining legitimacy in global governance 
and indeed a corrective for IGOs’ legitimacy deficits (Macdonald and Macdonald, 
2006; United Nations, 2004). Such analysis casts NGOs in the role of 
intermediates between IGOs and the general public where NGOs become 
representatives of global civil society or global public opinion that serves to 
counter the power of IGOs. However, some scholars argue that this is inherently 
a ‘faux legitimacy’ because NGOs and IGOs are engaged in circular discussions 
void of meaningful accountability (Anderson, 2010: 890).  
Based on this literature the main action involved in triggering a process of 
delegitimation involves an IGO terminating an NGO’s status within their 
organisation. A serious form of delegitimation would include litigation for breach 
of contract, whilst a weaker form would be non-renewal of contracts, both leading 
to loss of public affirmation and hence legitimacy. 
NGOs vis-a-vis peers. In the political climate of recent years the most called for 
regulation of NGOs has been self-regulation. This has been evident across the 
board from western governments and institutions alike (Council of Europe, 2007). 
The theoretical support for self-regulation at the international level has largely 
come from Brown’s (2008) work on how international NGOs can respond to 
legitimacy challenges, which has resulted in the creation of the INGO Charter 
(INGO Accountability Charter, 2005). Self-regulation often takes the shape of 
voluntary codes of conduct and good practice guides, although such frameworks 
have been criticised for catering to the requirements of donors at the expense of 
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other audiences (Gugerty and Prakash, 2010). The basic idea is that the power 
relationship between NGOs is on (somewhat) equal footing. However, research 
has shown that in reality it is more likely that resource rich NGOs dominate in 
their relationship with resource poor NGOs (Glazer et al., 2014).  
Peer based power relationships, as implemented through self-regulatory 
initiatives, are therefore likely to be subject to the participation of resource rich 
NGOs. Although voluntary codes of conduct can serve as stamps of approval or 
as seal of quality they are vulnerable to several faults. One is that there is no 
supervisory regulation with statutory authority to implement sanctions in cases of 
non-compliance. Second, as all codes are voluntary and intended as an incentive 
to achieve good standards in the NGO sector they are often defined to serve the 
interests of those in a dominant or peer position to NGOs, such as donors and 
legislative bodies. Such problems can trigger delegitimation because of lack of 
democratic scrutiny, perceived elitism in the form of alignment with the interests 
of those in powerful positions and, as with self-regulation in general, because of 
the absence of credible mechanisms for punishing failure or undesirable 
behaviour. 
NGOs vis-a-vis general public. Although this is possibly one of the largest 
audiences of NGOs it is also possibly a non-group. Nonetheless, I have included 
them here as some issues are worth considering under this template. Some 
attempts have been made to define this relationship where NGOs are defined as 
catalysts between governing bodies and the general public (Lang, 2012). 
However, it remains the case that the power dynamic in the relationship between 
the public and NGOs is ambivalent and poorly defined. A member of the general 
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public that is, directly or indirectly, affected by an NGO’s policy has very few 
outlets, apart from joining the NGO, to influence or voice their concerns. This 
places them in a weak position, as no formal mechanisms of engagement exist 
between these two entities/actors. As a result there is no 
definable/tangible/evident action that could constitute expressed consent. 
This raises a dilemma where on the one hand it is possible to ask whether, in the 
context of a liberal democracy, the general public needs to be included as an 
audience given there are other platforms to engage with NGOs. But on the other 
hand, if one is exploring representation outside of the traditional boundaries of 
the democratic political system, it is possible to ask whether this is indeed a 
missing audience. At the very least, we can argue that NGOs rely on the positive 
and trustful image that the general public reportedly has of them (Keating and 
Thrandardottir, forthcoming). Cultivating that public image is therefore important 
for NGOs’ credibility and legitimacy, as some scholars have amply argued 
(Brown, 2008; Hopgood, 2013; Yanacopulos, 2016). Although the concerns of 
this audience are to some extent served by the legislative and judiciary audience, 
this is still derivative interest. This audience is therefore tentatively suggested as 
a possible constituency.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to identify an NGO ‘socio-political community’ 
based on whom NGOs communicate with when they are seeking legitimacy. The 
paper has demonstrated that the existing literature clearly implies an audience in 
the context of legitimacy and representation, and that NGOs have a role to play 
in international politics that furthermore can be linked to issues surrounding how 
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these audiences confer legitimacy onto NGOs. The paper has provided a 
framework for a more rigorous analysis and a more nuanced understanding of 
NGO legitimacy based on who is supposed to confer legitimacy, in what capacity, 
and for what purpose. The audiences’ framework is an attempt to identify possible 
parameters which can be used to understand how NGOs can be held to account 
for their power as global actors. This should help provide more clarity about the 
limits of their power in international politics. 
Because NGOs are key actors in delivering ‘smart’ and ‘soft’ powers it is vital to 
understand the representational aspect of their legitimacy. If we want to situate 
NGOs differently from political parties and businesses we have to be able to 
demonstrate how NGOs’ power is legitimated and in what capacity. It is important 
to clarify not only who confers legitimacy onto NGOs, but also in what capacity, 
with what expectations, and how these audiences can limit NGOs’ power. These 
questions are fundamental to further discussions about stakeholders and 
assigning responsibilities based on who is entitled to hold NGOs to account for 
their use of their power and based on what criteria. By identifying how different 
audiences confer legitimacy onto NGOs it is possible to assess the characteristics 
of their representativeness. Whether NGOs are perceived to be, or function as, 
experts, service providers, or moral imperators their claims have an audience. 
Demarcating NGOs’ socio-political community advances our understanding of 
how we can better hold NGOs to account for their power. 
There are two issues that I would like to highlight in the conclusion. The first issue 
is about overcoming the ‘either international or domestic’ division in discussions 
on NGOs’ legitimacy. This is largely reflected in how their right to associate is 
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guaranteed. In western liberal democracies problems relating to NGOs’ freedom 
to associate are rarely judicial or legislative problems because the freedom to 
associate principle is one of the cornerstones of these political systems. In 
countries where associational freedom is not a legal right an NGO can often have 
multiple problems with the judicial and legislative audience because its ‘licence 
to operate’ is not constitutionally guaranteed. Overcoming this dilemma and 
guaranteeing NGOs supranational legal rights to associate freely is one of the 
key sticking points in future negotiations about their legitimacy. A weak or non-
existing support from the ‘legislators and judiciary’ audience can also translate 
into difficulties with other audiences whose consent NGOs rely on for 
sustaining/maintaining legitimacy. The domestic legal framework therefore 
highlights a fundamental difference between advanced democracies and weak or 
emerging democracies (and other political regimes). It furthermore highlights the 
feeble status of NGOs in international law, a law that seems unable to safeguard 
such basic aspects of NGOs’ legitimacy. 
The second issue is about making those who are supposed to benefit from the 
work NGOs do (beneficiaries) more central in the legitimation process. This 
audience is often taken for granted, or assumed, in the literature, as is the role of 
judiciary and legislators, despite being problematic for NGOs’ legitimacy in the 
sense that they have great potential to delegitimize NGOs. The problem is that 
this audience can politicize the role of NGOs. One outcome of such politicization 
is a conflict between what an NGO values and has prioritized as universal and 
what the local community or authority thinks of said values. This can also place 
an unnecessary burden of choice on beneficiaries in cases where aid is needed 
but normative values or priorities are not necessarily shared. In reality this 
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audience often has very limited impact on, or access to, decision-making 
processes of NGOs and are therefore restricted in their ability to hold NGOs to 
account. This is particularly problematic for international NGOs when their 
national offices function as representatives of an international office that is often 
registered in another country and therefore out of reach for most people who 
would otherwise be categorised as its beneficiaries. Special attention has 
therefore to be paid to normative arguments in relation to a non-representative 
understanding of NGOs because they tend to replace legitimation processes with 
abstract assessments of NGOs’ value statements and purposes. This problem is 
evident in the writings of Halpin and McLaverty (2010) and Rubenstein (2014) 
who try to grapple with how to solve it. These two issues are reflected in the 
framework as two different bases for NGOs’ legitimation of power. The first base 
is a rights-based power relationship characterised by NGOs claiming legitimacy 
grounded in their right to exist. The second base is about the credibility of the 
legitimacy claims NGOs make and how these can be evaluated independent of 
their right to exist. 
The audience typology tries to overcome such empirical and theoretical 
dichotomies by focusing on how NGO’s power is legitimated vis-a-vis different 
audiences. By identifying the characteristics of these power relations the 
framework tries to capture the complexities and nuances involved when defining 
the parameters of their socio-political community. This can hopefully be seen as 
step forwards in the debate about NGO legitimacy. 
  
Table 1  Audiences and their actions expressing consent  
      Legitimacy focus 
 
 
 
Target audience 
What is the action of 
expressed consent 
(reflecting the type 
of power 
relationship) 
Hidden 
assumptions 
(reflecting 
expectations about 
the purpose and 
abilities of NGOs)  
In what capacity are 
NGOs’ legitimacy 
claims considered 
(reflecting justification 
for conferring 
legitimacy) 
Problems (reflecting the 
quality of the action 
constituting consent) 
Lack of consent, no consent, 
or withdrawal of consent 
(triggers of delegitimation) 
Judiciary& 
legislators 
Courts 
Government 
(Regulators)  
Legal 
right/protection, 
NGOs granted legal 
rights to operate in 
a given territory 
under sovereign law 
(charity/ company 
law)  
Normative,  
Freedom of 
association 
(Western liberal 
democracies) 
Legal validity, 
Regulation 
Dependency on govt’s 
for rights to operate, 
political conflicts where 
govt’s do not favour 
NGOs. Issues 
regarding applicability 
of universal norms in 
domestic law  
Unable to register under the 
law. Litigations, state vs. 
NGO. NGO lacks legal 
validity, problems to 
fundraise, issues of trust, 
can impact operations 
Donors 
Institutional 
(Individual) 
 
Contracts  
Joint and/or 
predefined 
contractual targets 
(monitoring and 
evaluating) 
Legal validity  
Organisational 
capacity 
Financial 
accountability, 
outcomes of projects 
matter for future 
funding  
Legitimacy is defined in 
monetary terms, which 
distorts the normative 
purpose of NGOs. 
Money dominates the 
agenda and represses 
the political dimension 
of legitimacy. 
Withdrawal of funds,  
No renewal of funds, 
unsubscribe. NGO lacks 
money to continue their 
programs, directly impacts 
operations 
Supporters 
Domestic 
Global 
 
Action, physical or 
rhetorical 
(vocal support, 
volunteering, 
donations) 
Financial 
accountability, 
Legal validity 
Normative  
NGOs are doing the 
right thing, helping, 
caring, changing 
wrong to right 
Political agendas Voice or public mobilisation 
against the NGO to 
demonstrate withdrawal of 
support or discontent 
amounting to lack of 
support. NGO lacks moral 
support 
Members 
Country of 
registration 
 
Join the NGO  
Acceptance of the 
internal organisation 
of power in the 
NGO  
Legal validity  
Financial 
accountability, 
Normative  
Impacts in the wider 
society and globally 
Personal gains or 
remunerations from the 
NGO, unreasonable 
financial compensation, 
embezzling of funds 
No members join, NGO 
lacks people to function, 
credibility and trust issues 
Beneficiaries 
Individuals 
(States/gov’t)  
 
Acceptance of aid 
Cooperation 
Attending meetings 
Signed contracts? 
Legal validity 
Financial 
accountability, 
Political/ democratic 
Political and 
economic 
empowerment 
 
Is this a valid 
expression of consent? 
Is it given under 
restrain, lack of 
choices? Do they agree 
with NGOs’ values? 
Rejection of aid or 
assistance offered by the 
NGO. Complaints and 
redress via the NGO’s 
complaints mechanism (if 
there are any). NGO lacks 
credibility, rejection of values 
Intergovernmental/ 
International 
Institutions 
International/regional 
Country of origin 
Country of operation 
Religious institutions 
Signed contracts 
Registration  
Legal validity 
Financial 
accountability, 
Normative 
Epistemic 
Representational  
Global voice of 
disempowered 
peoples 
Global voice of norms  
Derived legitimacy 
from contracts 
False legitimacy, are 
NGOs legitimacy gap 
fillers for struggling 
IGOs? What is the 
nature of this symbiotic 
relationship? 
Lack of legal rights in 
international law 
Termination/non-renewal of 
special status in an IGO. 
Litigation, the IGO sues the 
NGO for breach of terms/ 
contract. NGO lacks 
affirmation from a 
governmental body, loss of 
public legitimacy. Structural 
delegitimation 
Peers 
Alliances 
Networks 
Partners?  
 
Declarations (oath) 
Codes of conduct 
(monitoring and 
evaluation) 
Join NGO Alliances 
and Charters 
Normative 
(Legal/financial) 
Reputation 
Self-regulation 
Trust 
Self-reinforced 
legitimacy? Trade off 
between legitimacy 
failures and reputation? 
Elitism? Lack of 
democratic regulation 
Not signing up to codes of 
conducts. NGO lacks 
sectoral recognition/ 
approval that can impact on 
trust 
General Public 
Country of origin 
Country of operation 
 
Limited ways to 
express consent  
Financial 
accountability,  
Regulation  
Legal validity 
Normative 
Normative 
NGOs are working for 
public benefit/good  
Is this a valid 
audience? Do the 
NGOs need their 
consent? Is this a 
missing audience? 
Organised effort in the 
media/public space to 
demonstrate there is lack of 
consent from the public. 
NGO lacks trust 
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